The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: Can it be good for efficiency?
Artyom Shneyerov () and
Chi Leung Wong
Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 1, 128-131
We consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model ofÂ Mortensen and Wright (2002). We find that private information typically deters entry. But, the welfare can actually be higher under private information.
Keywords: Markets; with; search; frictions; Matching; and; bargaining; Two-sided; incomplete; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:1:p:128-131
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