The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: Can it be good for efficiency?

Artyom Shneyerov () and Chi Leung Wong

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 1, 128-131

Abstract: We consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model of Mortensen and Wright (2002). We find that private information typically deters entry. But, the welfare can actually be higher under private information.

Keywords: Markets; with; search; frictions; Matching; and; bargaining; Two-sided; incomplete; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:1:p:128-131

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