Best-of-three all-pay auctions

Aner Sela

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 1, 67-70

Abstract: We study a best-of-three all-pay auction. It is shown that with values of winning and without values of losing, this auction is less productive (the players' total expected effort is smaller) than the one-stage all-pay auction. However, with different values of losing over the contest's stages it may be more productive than the one-stage all-pay auction.

Keywords: Multi-stage; contests; Best-of-three; contests; All-pay; auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Working Paper: BEST-OF-THREE ALL-PAY AUCTIONS (2009)
Working Paper: Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:1:p:67-70

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