Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm

Taro Kumano and Masahiro Watabe

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 2, 135-137

Abstract: We examine all dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm. Under substitutable and quota-filling choice functions, we show how untruthful dominant strategies look like. Our finding leads to the uniqueness of equilibrium outcome despite the possibility of multiple equilibria.

Keywords: Deferred; acceptance; algorithm; Multiple; equilibria; Dominant; strategy; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:2:p:135-137

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