The power to delay

Duozhe Li

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 2, 155-157

Abstract: This paper studies a bilateral bargaining game in which one party can suspend the game indefinitely. If suspension is costless, multiple equilibria arise; if suspension is costly and subject to a budget constraint, a unique equilibrium with immediate agreement is obtained.

Keywords: Bargaining; Suspension; Sanction; Budget; constraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:2:p:155-157

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