Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities

Yosef Mealem

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 2, 165-167

Abstract: A simple mechanism is presented that allocates an indivisible object between two agents for almost any possible compensation rule. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategy guarantees a level of utility not less than -[epsilon], where [epsilon] can be arbitrarily small.

Keywords: Indivisible; object; Individual; rationality; Guaranteed; utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:2:p:165-167

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