Equilibrium of a sequence of auctions when bidders demand multiple items

Qingmin Liu

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 2, 192-194

Abstract: We construct an ex post perfect equilibrium in a sequence of second-price auctions with two bidders where each bidder's marginal values for additional units are decreasing. This equilibrium implies an increasing path of transaction prices and is ex post efficient.

Keywords: Sequential; auctions; Ex; post; perfect; equilibrium; Declining; price; anomaly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:2:p:192-194

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