Overconfidence on public information

Deqing Zhou

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 3, 239-242

Abstract: This work sets the market maker as overconfident and shows that this will lead to a higher informed trading intensity, a more efficient market, a larger informed profit and a lower adverse selection.

Keywords: Insider; trading; Public; information; Overconfidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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