Identification of parameters in an asymmetric perfect information game

Nese YIldIz

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 3, 243-246

Abstract: We show the identification of important features of the model in a perfect information entry game with two players and asymmetric payoffs when there are no unbounded regressors and the distribution of the unobservables is not parametrically specified.

Keywords: Semiparametric; identification; Entry; games; Discrete; choice; Hypothesis; testing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:3:p:243-246

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