Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain

Lauren Nicole Merrill

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 3, 259-261

Abstract: If the number of individuals is odd, majority rule is the only non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice rule on the domain of linear orders that admit a Condorcet winner (Campbell and Kelly, 2003). This paper shows that the claim is false when the number of individuals is even, and provides a counterpart to the theorem for the even case.

Keywords: Condorcet; Majority; winner; Strategy-proof (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:3:p:259-261

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