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Public randomization in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with local interaction

Myeonghwan Cho

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 3, 280-282

Abstract: We consider a situation in which each agent observes only their neighbor's actions and locally interacts with them by playing prisoner's dilemma games. Introducing a public randomization, we construct an equilibrium which sustains cooperation and in which cooperation eventually resumes after any history.

Keywords: Repeated; prisoner's; dilemma; game; Local; interaction; Public; randomization; Network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:3:p:280-282