Public randomization in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with local interaction
Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 112, issue 3, 280-282
We consider a situation in which each agent observes only their neighbor's actions and locally interacts with them by playing prisoner's dilemma games. Introducing a public randomization, we construct an equilibrium which sustains cooperation and in which cooperation eventually resumes after any history.
Keywords: Repeated; prisoner's; dilemma; game; Local; interaction; Public; randomization; Network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:3:p:280-282
Access Statistics for this article
Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office
More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().