How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion

Audrey Hu

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 113, issue 1, 29-31

Abstract: This paper shows that in the classic symmetric and independent private value environments, the seller's optimal reserve price is a decreasing function of the number of bidders in the first-price auctions when the seller and/or buyers are risk averse.

Keywords: Bidder; number; Risk; aversion; Reserve; price; Independent; private; value; First-price; auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:1:p:29-31

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