Tinbergen controllability and n-player LQ-games
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (),
Andrew Hughes Hallett () and
Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 113, issue 1, 32-34
We study the relationship between equilibrium existence and uniqueness in LQ-games, and the classical theory of economic policy. By focusing on system controllability, we find necessary conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium that generalize results in the existing literature.
Keywords: Policy; games; Equilibrium; existence; Decentralization; Centralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:1:p:32-34
Access Statistics for this article
Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office
More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().