Economics at your fingertips  

Tinbergen controllability and n-player LQ-games

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (), Andrew Hughes Hallett () and Nicola Acocella

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 113, issue 1, 32-34

Abstract: We study the relationship between equilibrium existence and uniqueness in LQ-games, and the classical theory of economic policy. By focusing on system controllability, we find necessary conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium that generalize results in the existing literature.

Keywords: Policy; games; Equilibrium; existence; Decentralization; Centralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

Page updated 2020-01-17
Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:1:p:32-34