On strategic stability in discontinuous games

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 113, issue 2, 120-123

Abstract: We identify a class of discontinuous normal-form games whose members possess strategically stable sets, defined according to an infinite-game extension of Kohlberg and Mertens’s (1986) equilibrium concept, and show that, generically, a set is stable if and only if it contains a single Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Infinite game; Normal-form game; Strategic stability; Trembling-hand perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:2:p:120-123

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.007

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