Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction

David McAdams ()

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 114, issue 1, 83-85

Abstract: Suppose that bidders may publicly choose not to learn their values prior to a second-price auction with costly bidding. All equilibria with truthful bidding exhibit bidder ignorance when the number of bidders is sufficiently small. Ignorance considerations also affect the optimal reserve price.

Keywords: Information acquisition; Ignorance; Entry; Second-price auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517651100365X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:1:p:83-85

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.036

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().