Auctions with a random number of identical bidders

Moshe Haviv and Igal Milchtaich

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 114, issue 2, 143-146

Abstract: We examine and compare the (normally, mixed) symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies in first-price and all-pay common value multiple item auctions with a random number of bidders, who only seek one of the identical items and have the same budget.

Keywords: Auctions; Stochastic number of bidders; Random-player games; Identical bidders; Symmetric equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176511003454
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:2:p:143-146

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.016

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().