Gender differences in lying
Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 114, issue 2, 147-149
Aversion to lying has been consistently observed in sender–receiver games. Women have demonstrated greater aversion to lying for a small monetary benefit in these games than men. We test the robustness of this gender difference in a sender–receiver game with larger stakes. We find no difference in lying by gender.
Keywords: Experiment; Gender; Lying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D8 J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:2:p:147-149
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