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Gender differences in lying

Jason Childs

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 114, issue 2, 147-149

Abstract: Aversion to lying has been consistently observed in sender–receiver games. Women have demonstrated greater aversion to lying for a small monetary benefit in these games than men. We test the robustness of this gender difference in a sender–receiver game with larger stakes. We find no difference in lying by gender.

Keywords: Experiment; Gender; Lying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D8 J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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