Dissipative advertising signals quality: Static model with a continuum of types

Laurent Linnemer

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 114, issue 2, 150-153

Abstract: Advertising and price have been shown to signal product quality. Most works limit the number of types to high and low quality. I characterize the optimal separating marketing strategy when both quality and marginal cost are uncertain and continuous variables.

Keywords: Quality; Signaling; Dissipative advertising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L15 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Dissipative advertising signals quality: Static model with a continuum of types (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:2:p:150-153

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.011

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