Communication and reputation in procurement auctions — Some empirical evidence

Timo Heinrich ()

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 114, issue 2, 164-167

Abstract: This paper studies communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement auctions. Positive reputation ratings and engaging in communication increase a bidder’s probability of winning. Messages are primarily used to reduce the asymmetric information associated with transactions.

Keywords: Communication; Procurement auctions; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D83 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Communication and Reputation in Procurement Auctions – Some Empirical Evidence (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:2:p:164-167

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.014

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