Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate

Yair Tauman () and Ming-Hung Weng

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 114, issue 3, 241-244

Abstract: We show that an outside innovator has a higher incentive to innovate than an incumbent innovator, by auctioning off his patent rights exclusively to an incumbent firm. For significant innovations this is also superior to selling licenses directly.

Keywords: Patent licensing; Cournot oligopoly; Process innovation; Patent rights; Incentive to innovate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D45 L13 O32 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:3:p:241-244

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.023

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