Contest for power in organizations

Martin Gregor ()

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 114, issue 3, 280-283

Abstract: This paper explains the provision of private rent to powerful members in an organization as an outcome of a contest for power that raises the total contributions to the organization. A necessary condition for a socially efficient contest scheme with reimbursements is characterized.

Keywords: Contest; Reimbursement; Rent-seeking; Collective good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:3:p:280-283

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.027

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