On competition for listings

Hamid Beladi, Reza Oladi and Nicholas S.P. Tay

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 114, issue 3, 315-318

Abstract: We construct a model whereby stock exchanges take a new role as an information intermediary, notably absent in their roles. We show that exchanges differentiate themselves at subgame perfect equilibrium and will not race to the top or to the bottom.

Keywords: Information intermediary; Reputation capital; Listing requirements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 G1 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Working Paper: On Competition for Listings (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:3:p:315-318

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.006

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