Value of public information in sender–receiver games

Ying Chen

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 114, issue 3, 343-345

Abstract: I find in two classes of sender–receiver games that the receiver’s equilibrium payoff is not increasing in the informativeness of a public signal because the sender may transmit less information when the public signal is more informative.

Keywords: Value of information; Sender–receiver games; Cheap talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:3:p:343-345

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.007

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