A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets

Ron Lavi and Marina May

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 1, 100-103

Abstract: We show that any deterministic mechanism, for allocating identical items that are complements to budget-constrained bidders, cannot simultaneously satisfy individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, and no-positive-transfers. This holds even for two bidders, two items, and commonly-known budgets, and generalizes to richer settings.

Keywords: Budget constraints; Strategy-proofness; Pareto-optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:1:p:100-103

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.043

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