How burning money requires a lot of rationality to be effective

Christian Seel and Philipp Wichardt

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 1, 111-113

Abstract: This paper proposes an extension of the valuation equilibrium concept (Jehiel and Samet, 2007), which partly endogenises the underlying grouping of actions. The effect on equilibrium predictions is illustrated in a burning money game.

Keywords: Bounded rationality; Burning money; Forward induction; Valuation equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:1:p:111-113

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.044

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