Does the trust game measure trust?

Marius Brülhart and Jean-Claude Usunier

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 1, 20-23

Abstract: Could altruism explain observed choices in the standard trust game? With dominant altruism, trustors would give more to poor trustees. However, we find trustors to give no more to poor than to rich trustees, confirming trust as the dominant motivation for “trust like” choices.

Keywords: Trust game; Altruism; Experimental error (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:1:p:20-23

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.039

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