Welfare consequence of an asymmetric regulation in a mixed Bertrand duopoly

Toshihiro Matsumura

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 1, 94-96

Abstract: I investigate an asymmetric duopoly where a public enterprise must supply the demand it faces, while a private enterprise has no such obligation. I show that such an asymmetric regulation yields the first-best outcome (Walrasian equilibrium).

Keywords: Supply obligation; Unique pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium; Mixed markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 H4 K2 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:1:p:94-96

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.004

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