Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Jose Apesteguia and Miguel Ballester

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 2, 172-174

Abstract: Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) show that some naive participants may be better off under the Boston mechanism than under deferred acceptance. Here we show that under the veil of ignorance all naive students may prefer the Boston mechanism.

Keywords: School choice; Naive players; Welfare; Veil of ignorance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D0 D6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice (2011)
Working Paper: Welfare of Naive and Sophisticated Players in School Choice
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:2:p:172-174

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.032

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