Asymmetric partnerships

Nicolás Figueroa and Vasiliki Skreta

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 2, 268-271

Abstract: We study asymmetric partnerships and show that efficient dissolution is possible if critical types (where participation constraints bind) are equal. Ownership structures guaranteeing equal critical types always exist, but can be extremely unequal.

Keywords: Efficient mechanism design; Ownership structure; Partnerships (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:2:p:268-271

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.083

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