Differentiated interchange fees

Hans Zenger

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 2, 276-278

Abstract: Payment networks typically differentiate interchange fees across different merchant sectors. This paper shows that it is generally efficient for a regulator to leave the decision on the structure of interchange fees to payment networks.

Keywords: Interchange fees; Two-sided markets; Price discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 L31 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:2:p:276-278

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.093

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