Decision-making in competitive framings—Strategic behavior of chess players in mini-ultimatum game chess puzzles

Christoph Bühren, Björn Frank, Stefan Krabel and Alexander Werner

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 3, 356-358

Abstract: We introduce a competitive framing in the mini-ultimatum game utilizing chess puzzles. Therein, our chess playing participants accept low offers significantly more often compared to a neutral framing. We conclude that in familiar competitive surroundings egoistic behavior is more acceptable.

Keywords: Mini-ultimatum game; Framing; Chess-puzzle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:356-358

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.080

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