Farmers’ performance and subject pool effect in decentralized bargaining markets

Israel Waichman () and Christiane Ness

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 3, 366-368

Abstract: We report results from a decentralized bargaining market experiment conducted with farmers and students. Our results indicate that despite its bad reputation, performance is highly efficient (although not as efficient as the competitive equilibrium prediction). Farmers and students perform similarly regarding quantities, prices, and allocative efficiencies, but not regarding payoff allocations between buyers and sellers.

Keywords: Artefactual field experiment; Subject pool; Decentralized bargaining markets; Farmers; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D40 Q10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:366-368

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.054

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