Low-quality leadership in a vertically differentiated duopoly with Cournot competition

Luca Lambertini () and Alessandro Tampieri

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 3, 396-398

Abstract: We model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame, perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leader’s role.

Keywords: Endogenous timing; Product quality; Sequential play (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176511006197
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:396-398

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.096

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().