Rock–paper–scissors and cycle-based games

Eric Bahel ()

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 3, 401-403

Abstract: The present work characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium for games that are based on a cyclic preference relation. In the Nash equilibrium of these games, each player randomizes between three specific actions. In particular, an alternative way of deriving the unique Nash equilibrium of the rock–paper–scissors game is proposed.

Keywords: Cycle; Nash equilibrium; Prudent strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:401-403

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.098

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