Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers

Shulin Liu, Jun Li and De Liu

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 3, 408-411

Abstract: We analyze multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers. As the number of suppliers increases or the suppliers become more risk-averse, the equilibrium bidding price decreases under the first-score auction but remains the same under the second-score auction. A buyer prefers the first-score auction.

Keywords: Procurement auctions; Multi-attribute auctions; Risk aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 H57 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:408-411

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.099

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