Local interaction in tax evasion

Barnabás M. Garay, Andras Simonovits () and János Tóth

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 3, 412-415

Abstract: When individuals underreport their incomes, they take into account their private gains and moral losses, the latter depending on the acquaintances’ previous underreports. We prove that under quite natural assumptions the process globally converges to the symmetric steady state.

Keywords: Tax evasion; Steady state; Asymptotic stability; Symmetrization; Networks; Monotone maps (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:412-415

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.066

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