Charities and the political support for estate taxation

Georges Casamatta, Helmuth Cremer and Pierre Pestieau

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 3, 423-426

Abstract: We explain why wealthy people often favor estate taxation, while wealthless people oppose it. Wealthy people devote part of their estate to charities. Estate taxation with tax breaks for charities increases contributions to an otherwise underprovided public good.

Keywords: Estate taxation; Charities; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Charities and the political support for estate taxation (2012)
Working Paper: Charities and the political support for estate taxation (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:423-426

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.101

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