Crime and moral hazard: Does more policing necessarily induce private negligence?
Brishti Guha () and
Ashok S. Guha
Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 3, 455-459
Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.
Keywords: Crime; Policing; Private precautions; Moral hazard; Diversification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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