Crime and moral hazard: Does more policing necessarily induce private negligence?

Brishti Guha () and Ashok S. Guha

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 3, 455-459

Abstract: Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.

Keywords: Crime; Policing; Private precautions; Moral hazard; Diversification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:455-459

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.105

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