Symmetry-based compromise and the Nash solution to convex bargaining problems

Yongsheng Xu

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 3, 484-486

Abstract: A new axiom, symmetry-based compromise, is introduced to study solutions to convex bargaining problems. It is shown that any efficient solution that is also scale invariant and satisfies symmetry-based compromise must be Nash.

Keywords: Convex bargaining problems; Symmetry-based compromise; Efficiency; Scale invariance; Nash solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:484-486

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.109

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