Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets

Alexander Matros

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 3, 500-503

Abstract: This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Adverse selection; Winner’s curse; Takeover game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:500-503

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.128

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