On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria

Hans Carlsson and Philipp Wichardt

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 3, 504-507

Abstract: In this paper, we demonstrate that the existence of sequential equilibria may depend on the players holding beliefs which are tailored to the respective equilibrium but otherwise difficult to justify. We also discuss potential remedies.

Keywords: Beliefs; Sequential equilibrium; Existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:504-507

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.129

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