The evolution of preferences for conflict

Karl Wärneryd

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 116, issue 1, 102-104

Abstract: We consider preference evolution in a class of conflict models with finite populations. We show that whereas aggregate conflict effort is always the same in evolutionary equilibrium, larger populations have greater individual subjective costs of conflict effort.

Keywords: Conflict; Contest; Preference evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:1:p:102-104

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.018

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