Double implementation in Nash and M-Nash equilibria

Jianxin Yi

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 116, issue 1, 105-107

Abstract: In this paper, we give a sufficient condition for double implementation in Nash and M-Nash equilibria. Furthermore, we discuss the mechanism with transfers and prove that some important social choice rules are doubly implemented in Nash and M-Nash equilibria by the mechanism with transfers.

Keywords: Nash implementation; M-Nash implementation; Double implementation; Mechanism with transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:1:p:105-107

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.021

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