Voracity, growth, and welfare

Kenji Fujiwara

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 116, issue 1, 11-14

Abstract: This paper explores some implications of the comparison between feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for growth and welfare in a ‘voracity’ model. We show that, as compared to the Nash equilibrium, the Stackelberg equilibrium involves a lower growth rate, while it leaves both the leaders and the followers better off, i.e., the Stackelberg equilibrium is Pareto superior to the Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Dynamic game; Growth; Welfare; Feedback Nash equilibrium; Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 O41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:1:p:11-14

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.092

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