Bertrand competition with intermediation

Xiaoying Liang, Lei Xie and Houmin Yan

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 116, issue 1, 112-114

Abstract: We consider a duopolistic Bertrand competition setting in which competing firms can turn into intermediaries. The intermediation option allows firms to take advantage of the rival firm’s low price. We then give conditions for the existence of equilibrium.

Keywords: Bertrand competition; Intermediation; Pure strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:1:p:112-114

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.019

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