An empirical investigation of efficiency and price uniformity in competing auctions

T. Andersson, C. Andersson and F. Andersson
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tommy Andersson

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 116, issue 1, 99-101

Abstract: This paper investigates hypotheses related to efficiency and price uniformity in online competing auctions based on two theoretical predictions from Peters and Severinov [Peters, M., Severinov, S., 2006. Internet auctions with many traders. Journal of Economic Theory 130, 220–245]. The investigation is conducted using a large and ideal data set for online competing train ticket auctions, and the findings support the theoretical predictions in large parts.

Keywords: Competing auctions; Cross-bidding; Efficiency; Price uniformity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:1:p:99-101

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.023

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