Testing post-cartel pricing during litigation

Can Erutku

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 116, issue 3, 339-342

Abstract: Harrington (2004) shows that conspirators can have incentives to maintain high prices after the cartel’s discovery to reduce damages they are likely to pay. We exploit the existence of a discovered retail gasoline price-fixing cartel in the province of Quebec to test this theory. The empirical results provide some support for Harrington (2004)’s predictions.

Keywords: Post-cartel; Price manipulation; Residual collusion; Gasoline (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:3:p:339-342

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.03.033

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