Another direct proof for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem

Uuganbaatar Ninjbat ()

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 116, issue 3, 418-421

Abstract: We prove the following result which is equivalent to the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem: when there are at least 3 alternatives, for any unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, at any given profile if an individual’s top ranked alternative differs from the social choice, then she can not change the social choice at that profile by changing her ranking. Hence, proving it yields a new proof for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem.

Keywords: The Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem; Strategy-proofness; Option sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176512001395
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:3:p:418-421

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.009

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().