On the inappropriateness of collective rent seeking analysis when agents exert within-group and between-group efforts

Kjell Hausken

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 116, issue 3, 504-507

Abstract: The ratio of within-group to between-group fighting is shown to be unrealistically high for the collective rent seeking model when agents exert two efforts i.e. within-group and between-group efforts. The ratio is more realistic for the production and conflict model. Six economics examples illustrate the unrealistic implications of rent seeking analysis.

Keywords: Rent seeking; Production; Conflict; Two efforts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 L (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:3:p:504-507

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.060

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