Overconfidence, public disclosure and long-lived information

Deqing Zhou

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 116, issue 3, 626-630

Abstract: We analyze a strategic trading model where an overconfident insider is required to publicly disclose his trades after the fact. We find the more confident insider is more concerned about the effect the initial trading has on the future.

Keywords: Insider; Market makers; Overconfidence; Public disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:3:p:626-630

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.022

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