Fully aggregative games

Richard Cornes and Roger Hartley

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 116, issue 3, 631-633

Abstract: A game is fully aggregative if payoffs and marginal payoffs depend only on a player’s own strategy and a function of the strategy profile which is common to all players. We characterize the form which this function must take in such a game and show that the game will be strategically equivalent to another game in which the function is the simple sum of strategies.

Keywords: Noncooperative game theory; Aggregative games; Additive separability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Fully Aggregative Games (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:3:p:631-633

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.024

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